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In the theoretical framework considered in the two seminal contributions, Grossman and 
Hart (GH,  1988)  and Harris and Raviv (HR,  1989), the "one share, one vote"  (lSlV) 
rule is optimal whether private benefits are enjoyed by the incumbent or the rival.  In 
practice, deviations from  1SlV are frequent.  We complete the GH-HR analysis in three 
ways.  First, we  give  both incumbent and  rival management private benefits.  Second, 
we  not only examine the behaviour and  optimality of  feasible  rules  in  a  local  or  ex 
post  sense  (i.e.  at the moment the rival appears and his characteristics are observed), 
but we  also  consider the ex  ante problem where the entrepreneur-founder only knows 
the distribution from which the rival will be drawn.  The issue is what set of rules the 
entrepreneur will  put in  place,  re  take-overs,  so as  to maximise the IPO value of the 
firm.  Lastly,  we  go  beyond the dual-class case,  explaining the role  and usefulness  of 
multiple-class structures. 
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Introduction 
This paper examines how  voting structure and take-over rules can influence the value 
of a  company and whether deviations from  the one-share one-vote  (lS1V) rule create 
extra value for the initial shareholders of the firm.  The seminal papers in the literature 
on voting structure, Grossman and Hart (GH,  1988)  and Harris and Raviv (HR,  1989), 
derive conditions  for  the optimality of lSI  V.  Both papers have  a  rather similar set-
up  (which we  broadly adopt in our paper).  Specifically,  there are two  types of cash 
flows:  the security benefits  accruing to the security holders,  and the private benefits 
obtained by  the controlling party.  A rival management team attempts to dismiss the 
incumbent managers and take control of the target firm.  Incumbent and rival teams have 
different management abilities, which affects the level of both the security benefits and 
the private benefits.  GH find that, by and large, ISIV is optimal.  They do acknowledge 
exceptions,  but confine that part of their analysis to an example,  arguing that these 
exceptions should be rare and insignificant.  Harris and Raviv likewise find that under 
their conditions a single voting security is optimal. 
We show that this conclusion may be somewhat hasty,  for  two  reasons.  First,  the 
GH-HR analysis assumes that the rival's abilities to generate and divert cash are known 
at the time the charter was  written or last revised.  One could argue, however, that at 
that time the rival's cash-generating abilities are usually known only in a probabilistic 
sense.  Thus,  the question arises as to how the entrepreneur should draft the take-over 
items in  the charter  ex  ante,  that is,  having  in  mind  a  distribution  rather than an 
individual realization.  Second, GH and HR essentially consider cases where only one of 
the contestants can extract private benefits, either the incumbent or the rival.  However, 
if one team can extract some rents,  why would another one in the same position not 
be able to do so-€specially as  even GH-HR seem to be in two  minds as  to at which 
side the private benefits are most likely?  We show that, by excluding the case where 
both contenders can derive private benefits, GH-HR miss cases where 1SlV does not do One share, one vote?  2 
well even ex post, that is, in the absence of uncertainty about the rival's characteristics.  1 
Consistent with this, our ex ante analysis fails to produce even a single case where 1SlV 
does better than the two competing dual-class charters that enter our horse race. 
Dual-class security structures have  been studied before.  Bergstrom and Rydqvist 
(1992)  analyse why differences occur in take-over bids on shares which differ in voting 
rights.  The authors therefore introduce a blockholder and restrict private benefits to 
synergy gains for  the bidding company,  thus focusing  on  extra rents for  the bidding 
firm only.  Their analysis shows that a blockholder prefers a dual class structure, even if 
1SlV maximizes the value of the firm.  The rival's bid prices are equal for both classes 
when  there is  no  influential blockholder, otherwise bids are differentiated.  Bergstrom 
and Rydqvist provide tests on Swedish data.  Taylor and Whittred (1998)  empirically 
examine the use of dual class stock in the Australian IPO market and find that firms 
with dual class shares are comparatively small and their firm value positively related to 
the human capital of the founding shareholders, rather than to assets in place.  And, as 
mentioned, Grossmand and Hart (1983)  offer some numerical examples of cases where 
lSI  V does less well. 
This paper is structured as follows.  In Section 1 we set up the model.  The analysis 
of the actual take-over game, given the set of rules laid down in the corporate charter, 
follows  in Section 2.  Section 3 provides a GH-HR style ex ante analysis of the optimal 
charter, and Section 4 the results of the ex post analysis.  Section 5 concludes. 
1  Model set-up 
The setting is as follows:  An entrepreneur with no financial resources has started up a 
firm.  She appoints a management team i, the incumbent, under whose control the firm 
generates security cash flows  Yi  and private benefits Zi.  The entrepreneur also issues 
multiple classes of shares with various degrees of voting power and cash flow  rights.  In 
most of the paper, we limit this to a dual-class system with class-A and class-B shares 
lThe thrust of these two major contributions is to be seen in their oontext.  Both papers are written 
at a time a policy debate was in full swing, with the discussion being whether the ISlV structure had 
to be a requirement for listing on a US  stock exchange.  The research question in GH, for instance, is 
therefore more focused on whether exceptions should be allowed for or not, rather than on examining 
the mechanics behind these deviations.  Furthermore, in the US dual-class structures are rather rare. One share, one vote?  3 
having,  respectively,  voting powers  Va  and Vb  =  1 - Va,  and cash-flow  rights  SaY and 
SbY = (1 - sa).  The entrepreneur also sets a level for  a, the proportion of votes a team 
needs to assume control of the company.  Lastly, she sells all claims to atomistic, risk-
neutral investors.  Neither the incumbent management nor any potential rival owns any 
of these securities. 
The take-over issue then arises from the arrival of a rival, r, under whose management 
the firm would generate a cash flow  Yr and private benefits Zr.  These characteristics are 
known to all investors.  This rival management team publicly announces its bid, taking 
into account that any bid may trigger a  counterbid from  the incumbent,  revised bids 
from r,  and so on.  In line with GH-HR,  bids are conditional offers for  all shares.  After 
r's final bid (and i's final counterbid, if any), investors choose to tender shares or votes to 
either i or r.  In fact, under our full-information assumption nothing is gained by playing 
a multi-stage game:  r moves only if he will succeed, and r's first move, if any, will be his 
only one.  After this bidding/tendering stage, a vote is  held,  and all shareholders vote. 
A change of control occurs when more than the fraction a  of the voters vote in favour 
of the change; and if a  is below 1/2, the largest group of votes determines the issue.2 
Before we solve the problem for the entrepreneur regarding the voting and security 
structure, we consider the control contest in more detail. 
2  Analysis of the bidding game 
Without loss of generality we assume that the A shares represent at least as many votes 
as  the B shares,  i.e.  va::::  Vb.  Table 1 shows that there could be two types of bidding 
contests: 
•  the double bid:  r  bids for  both the A and B shares  (if that is  needed to achieve a 
supermajority or to avoid a tie), and i can thwart r  by buying either A or  B; 
•  the single bid:  r bids for the A shares, and i can thwart r only by buying these very 
A shares. 
2GH assume a > 1/2 to avoid degenerate solutions.  By accepting that, in such a case, the majority 
determines the outcome, we do not need this assumption. One share, one vote?  4 
Table 1 
charter  bidding game 
equal voting power (va = Vb  = 1/2) 
a>  Va = Vb  • r needs both A and B to muster a  of the vote 
• i needs either A or B to block r 
a = Va = Vb  • r needs both A and B to avoid a tie 
• i needs either A or B to block r 
unequal voting power (va> 1/2 >  Vb) 
a>  Va> Vb  • r needs both A and B to muster a  of the vote 
• i needs either A or B to block r 
a = Va> Vb  • A suffices for  r  to win 
or va> a;::: Vb  • A suffices for  i  to block r 
or Va> Vb> a  • B is useless to both rand i 
Thus, a single bid by r  for  the B shares cannot be rational.  We start our analysis with 
the bidding war for  the A-shares. 
2.1  The bidding war for the A  shares 
The characteristics of the optimal bid prices Pa,.  if r  is  to win a bid for the A-shares3 
are: 
Pa,r  >  Pa,;,  (2.1) 
Pa,r  >  saYr,  (2.2) 
Pa,r  <  saYr + z,.,  (2.3) 
Pa,;  >  SaYi,  (2.4) 
Pa,;  <  SaYi +  Zi·  (2.5) 
Condition (2.1)  simply says that r  outbids i.  The lower bound on  r's bid price in 
(2.2)  is the free-rider bound:  even if r outbids i, the shareholders will still not tender 
to r as long as the offer price remains below the post-bid security value of those shares. 
The upper bound on  r's bid prices in  (2.3)  is  r's reservation price,  beyond which r's 
3FrOID the shareholder's point of view the conditions of success for a bid on the A shares are in-
dependent of the take-over's impact on the B shares.  The reason is that atomistic investors treat the 
probability of a change of control as  unaffected by their own decision.  Thus, when bidding is for the 
A-shares, the effect ofthe contest on the B-shares is irrelevant in the investor's decision (not) to tender 
A shares. One share, one vote?  5 
profit turns negative: the total amount of premia paid over and above the security value 
cannot rationally exceed r's entire private benefits.  The conditions on  i's offer,  in the 
last two equations, are analogous. 
From this we immediately obtain the condition under which r wins this contest and 
the price at which this occurs.  Notably, r can (and will) win a contest for  the A shares 
if her reservation price exceeds that of i.  That is, if there is a contest for  the A-shares, 
r  will win if 
SaYr +  Zr  > SaYi + Zi· 
The most economical bid that meets all constraints (2.1)-(2.3) then is 
Pa,r = Max(saYr, SaYi + Zi), 
implying that the target company woudl be worth 
v,.A  Max(saYr, SaYi + Zi) + SbYr, 
Yr +  Max(Zi +  SalVi  - Yr], 0). 
In contrast, if (2.6) is not met the value of the target company stays at Vi. 
The lSlV outcome can be obtained by setting Sa  =  1 =  Va. 




If  r is to win a double-bid game, then for both the A and B shares r's offer must beat i's, 
clear the no-free-riding hurdle, and leave r some gain.  This already yields five conditions, 
Pa,r  >  Pa,i, 
Pb,r  >  Pb,j,  (2.9) 
Pa,r  >  SaYr, 
Pb,r  >  SbYr,  (2.10) 
Pa,r +  Pb,r  <  Yr + Zr·  (2.11) 
With respect to the last equation, note that r's private benefits now provide the upper 
bound on the total premia spent (over and above the security value) for  both classes of 
securities together. At this point, two advantages of the incumbent over the rival become 
apparent.  First, while the rival needs the votes from  both classes of shares to make a One share, one vote?  6 
successful bid on the target company, the incumbent can block this bid by focusing on 
only one class of shares.  Second, the rival makes the first move,  so the incumbent can 
wait and see whether a winning counterbid is feasible and, if two counterbids are feasible, 
which of these is the cheaper one.  Thus, r should be prepared for a counterbid for either 
the A or B shares, each being within i's relevant constraints (no free riding, and no loss 
for  i): 
either SaYi < Pa,i  <  SaYi +  Zi, 
or SbYi  < Pb,i  <  SbYi +  Z;.  (2.12) 
From this, the conditions under which r wins, and the corresponding prices, again follow 
immediately.  The rival has to make sure that i can top neither Pa,r  nor Pb,r  even when 
the incumbent team would spend its entire private benefits on buying one type of shares: 
Pa,r  >  SaYi +  Zi, 
Pb,r  >  SbYi + Zi· 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
For these bids to be possible, r's rationally spendable resources must exceed the sum of 
i's alternative reservation prices, i.e. 
Yr +  Zr > Yi + 2zi.  (2.15) 
Note that, unlike in (2.6), to i  a dollar of private benefits now provides twice as much 
firepower as it does to r.  To  dampen any excessive excitement among poison-pill con-
sultants, though,  we  should perhaps note that this extra-firepower feature is  relevant 
only when Yi  is sufficiently large relative to Yr.  Indeed, when Yi  is way below Yr,  the 
doubling of the efficacity of Z;  would not help at all in raising the hurdle for r.  Details 
are provided in Section 4. 
If  (2.15) is met, r takes over the target at the lowest prices that satisfy both (2.13), 
(2.14), and the free-rider bounds; that is, the value of the firm becomes 
v;.AB  Pa,r + Pb,r 
Max(saYr, SaYi +  Zi) + Max(SbYr, SbYi + Zi) 
Yr +  Max(O, Sa(Yi - Yr) + Zi) +  Max(O, Sb(Yi - Yr) + Z;).  (2.16) One share, one vote?  7 
2.3  A digression to multiple-class structures 
We saw that a double-bid dual-class charter can force a sufficiently strong rival to fork 
out more cash.  In this subsection we briefly abandon our dual-class approach and verify 
to what extent a multiple-class structure could  add more  benefits  of that type.  We 
start with three classes of shares, A, B and C, and we assume without loss of generality 
that Va  > Vb  > Ve.  With just three classes an  exhausting classification of all  possible 
structures, in the style of Table 1, already becomes rather tedious, so we confine ourselves 
to a discussion of some illustrative cases.  Our purpose is to show that some three-class 
games can be reduced to the single- and double-bid ganes we  have already considered, 
while for other parameter values a triple-bid game can emerge that may add more value. 
Consider,  for  instance,  a charter with (va> Vb  >  )Ve  > a.  If  Vb  + Ve  <  Va,  then 
holding the A-shares is enough to meet the a-hurdle without any risk of being outvoted. 
This leads  to the single-bid  game we  already analysed,  with rand i  fighting  for  the 
A-shares, and with a composite security,  B+C, now taking the role played by B in the 
dual structure we had before.  The existence of third class is of little importance here. 
Consider, next, a charter with a>  Va(>  Vb > v e) and (Va+Vb > va+ve >  )Vb+Ve > a. 
The rival goes for a combination of two classes (whichever pair is cheaper) to muster the 
required votes and be safe from being outvoted. The incumbent can thwart r's plan by 
bidding for either of whichever pair r goes for.  Thus, r must set the prices such that i can 
not outbid him for either of the two, which again provides i with the doubled firepower 
per unit of Zi  like in the double-bid games we considered in the previous section. 
Consider, lastly,  a charter with a > Va(> Vb  > v e)  and Va + Vb +  Ve  > a > Va + Vb. 
Here, to muster the required number of votes and be safe from being outvoted, r needs 
all three classes.  The incumbent, by contrast, can stop the takeover by obtaining either 
the A-,  or the B-,  or the C-shares.  Thus, r's bid for  each and every class must be such 
that it it cannot be beaten by i:  Pa,r  > BaY; +  Zi,  Pb,r  > SbYi +  Zi  and Pe,r  > SeY; +  Zi, 
implying Pa,r +  Pb,r + Pe,r > Yi + 3Zi and.  therefore, Yr + Zr > Yi + 3Zi .  Here, the triple-bid 
game provides i  with three times the nominal firepower per unit of Zi.  Thus, provided 
the rival is sufficiently rich to afford this, a triple-bid charter would improve the"value 
of the firm. 
In general, then, multiple-class share structures are a way of milking a rival that has 
a total cash-generating ability (y +  z) exceeding that of the incumbent; and any Zi  units One share, one vote?  8 
of added total value warrants a new class of securities and a voting structure that forces 
r to buy each and every class of shares. Two caveats are in order, though.  First, if Yr  is 
quite high relative to Yj,  the no-free-riding bound may already be so tough that r would 
be paying out most of the added value even without a double or triple bid.  Second, if a 
triple-bid charter is installed before the rival is  known,  it may spoil useful takeovers if 
the rival turns out to be of less than the triple-star quality the founder hoped for. 
*  *  * 
This second caveat has brought us to the main issue of the paper.  The problem for the 
entrepreneur is  how to specify the required fraction of votes Oi,  as well  as the cash-flow 
and voting rights (sa  and va)  for  the classes of equity,  so  as to maximize the value of 
the firm.  In the next section we again consider just two classes of shares.  Starting from 
the conditions and payoff structures for single- and double-bid charters, we verify which 
charter does best among lSIV, the single-bid structure, and the double-bid one. 
The assumption underlying GH-HR's work is that when r show up, the founder has 
ample opportunity to size him up and then design a charter that extracts the maximum 
price out of him.  In reality,  the founder would rarely have the chance at such surgical 
precision.  Thus,  we give the founder a much blunter instrument, viz.  a charter that 
is tailored to a given distribution but that, once set, applies to any drawing from that 
distribution.  After this  ex  ante analysis of Section 3,  we  still provide,  in Section 4,  a 
GH-HR type ex post analysis.  This approach serves to explain some of the less obvious 
patterns in our findings, and to show that the disagreement with GH-HR is caused caused 
not by the ex  ante feature of our approach but by the presence of private benefits on 
two sides. 
3  Ex-ante optimal sharing & voting structure under 
uncertainty 
We choose normal distributions for Yr  and Zr.  The values for  Yi  and Zj, in contrast, are 
deterministic because the entrepreneur appoints a known  party as  the initial manage-
ment team.  We normalise the value for  Yi  to unity and consider expected values for  Yr 
that range from  (on average)  "bad" to "good"-O.8, 0.9,  1,  1.1  and 1.2-and standard 
deviations of either 0.2 or 0.3.  For Zr, we choose distributions with means of 0.05,  0.1, One share, one vote?  9 
0.15,  0.2,  0.25  and 0.3,  and standard deviation of 0.02.  Our (deterministic) values for 
Zi  are set at in lower zone of the same range of average  ZrS:  0.05,  0.1  and 0.15.  This 
gives us in total 180 different combinations of distributions, each with its optimal choice 
of voting structure and its resulting value of the target firm.  We solve numerically, by 
discretizing and assigning the according probability value for the joint normal distribu-
tions to each point in the [Yr  , zrl  grid.  In total, we calculate values of about 40,000 grid 
points.  Then we  maximise the value of the firm by varying/optimizing the proportion 
of cash flow  rights assigned to each class of securities. 
The optimized expected values of the firm are illustrated in Figures 2 and 4.  The left-
hand-side column of graphs shows results for  Zi =  0.05,  the middle column for  Zi =  0.1, 
and the rightmost column for Zi =  0.15.  Each row of graphs refers to a particular mean 
value of the distribution for Yr,  which increases from 0.8 (in the top row) to 1.2 (bottom 
row).  Within each of the 15 graphs, the mean Zr then varies along the x-axis from 0.05 
to 0.3.  An individual bar in each trio of bars refers to the value of the firm  under a 
particular share/vote structure, with the left bar showing the value of the target firm 
under 1SlV, the second bar referring to a double-bid dual-class structure, and the third 
bar referring to single-bid one.  Each set of 15 graphs is linked to A particular standard 
deviation for Yr:  .2 in Figure 2, and.3 in Figure 3.  Figure 3 corresponds, graph by graph, 
with Figure 2 and shows how the Sa is optimally set for the single- and double-bid cases. 
There are obvious general patterns, like increasing values when we go down the rows 
of graphs (higher Yr), when we go from the left column to the right one (higher Zi)4, and 
when we move to the right within each of the 15 graphs (higher zr).  Our main interest, 
however, is the comparison of the different voting structures.  In marked contrast to the 
GH-HR prediction, 1SlV never comes out first, a result that will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.  Generally, the double-bid dual-class charter seems to do better than 
the single-bid one if r offers a higher security value Yr,  but especially so when relatively 
more private benefits  (on  average)  can  be extracted by the rival  management  team. 
Conversely,  when the incumbent management team is able to extract relatively more 
private benefits than its rival team, a single-bid charter seems to do better for  a wider 
range of distributions for r  characteristics. 
4A higher z,  forces r to bid higher, and r is often able to do so because in our experiments Zr tends 
to be above z,. One share,  one vote?  10 
Increasing the standard deviation for Yr  from 0.2 to 0.3 (Figure 4) tends to intensify 
the value differences, not an unexpected finding in light of the option-like features in the 
valuation formulae.  Qualitatively, though, the observations remain unaffected. 
Figure 3  shows the optimum  8a'S  underlying the values  in  Figure  2.  We  note a 
tendency for extreme choices for  8a  in the double-bid case when the rival comes out of a 
distribution with potentially higher private benefits.  The picture for the single-bid case 
is more varying, generally displaying a more U- or hill-shaped pattern. 
-It  is, we think, fair to say that our results are rather different from the GH-HR ones. 
To confirm  this result  and deepen  our understanding,  we  look at the same problem 
again, this time following GH-HR more closely by assuming away all uncertainty about 
r's cashfl.ow  generating capabilities.  Thus,  in the next  section  we  show that even if 
we  adopt the GH-HR certainty assumption,  1SlV is  rarely optimal.  In addition, this 
analysis helps the interpretation of some of the ex ante results in the uncertainty case. 
4  GH-HR Ex Post optimal sharing &  voting struc-
ture 
Starting from  the conditions  and payoff structures for  single- and  dual-class bids of 
Section  2 we  examine in what optima the formally  dual structure collapses into  a  a 
virtual IS  IV. Such a pseudo-1S1V arises when the optimal dual-class charter is a single-
bid one with 8a = 1.  Such a charter is as good as lSI  V since the votes assigned to the 
B-shares are, apparently, not useful to anybody. A double-bid optimum, in contrast, can 
never collapse to a virtual lSI  V: even when 8a = 1, the double-bid assumption is that the 
class-B shares are needed for a majority, which is incompatible with IS  IV-equivalence. 
4.1  Scenario 1:  The incumbent provides larger security bene-
fits 
Mathematically, the GH-HR type analysis depends heavily on whether Yi  > YT  or not.  In 
this section we consider all cases with Yi  > Yr,  in ascending order of Zr.  With Yi > Y., a 
higher 8a generally increases the takeover value, which also means that the requirements 
in terms of Zr become tougher  . 
•  Zr  < Zi·  This implies that, even with 8a  =  0,  r's reservation price remains below i's. One share,  one vote?  11 
There is no bid, and the firm value is Yi. 
•  Zi  :-:;  Zr  :-:;  Zi +  (Yi - Yr).  With these parameter values it is feasible for the entrepreneur 
to trigger a bid on the A shares.  For instance, with a charter stipulating Sa =  0,  the 
no-loss condition (2.6) for a bid on the A shares simplifies to Zr  > Zi,  which is satisfied 
in the domain currently considered.  But as a higher Sa improves the value of the firm, 
it is optimal to increase Sa until the no-loss condition (2.6) holds as an equality.  Thus, 
we  get the rent-extracting solution, 
·f  h  0  •  Zr  - Zi  1  VA.  I  Zi:S Zr  :-:;  Zi +  Yi  - Yr  t  en  :-:;  Sa = ---:-:;  =}  r  = Yr + Zr· 
Yi -Yr 
(4.17) 
The last result follows from plugging the optimal Sa into (2.8).  Obviously, the optimal 
charter is  not a pseudo-1 S  1  V one-except in the special case  Zi  - Zr  =  Yr  - Yi  (=} 
Sa =  1).  With the optimal charter, r just breaks even.  A 1S1V rule would have made 
the takeover impossible.5 
•  Zi + (Yi  - Yr)  :-:;  Zr  :S  2Zi + (Yi  - Yr).  Here,  a bid for  (just)  the A shares can still 
be triggered, but since we cannot increase Sa beyond unity it is no longer possible to 
have r payout all rents.  Instead, we get the corner solution, 
if Zi + (Yi  - Yr):-:;  Zr  :-:;  2Zi + (Yi  - Yr)  then s: =  1 =} v;.A.  =  Yi + Zi·  (4.18) 
In this case we do  have  a quasi-1S1V rule:  Sa = 1 =  Va would  perform equally well 
as a two-class/single-bid structure with Sa = 1 > Va > 1/2 that we consider here. 
•  Zr  > 2Zi +  (Yi - Yr).  Now a double-bid takeover becomes possible.  In the value formula 
(2.16),  both MaxO  terms are "in the money"  because Zi  2:  0 and,  by  assumption, 
Yi  > Yr·  Thus, v,.AB  =  Yr + (Yi  - Yr) + 2Zi  = Yi + 2zi, which dominates the outcome 
of the single-bid solution, Yi + Zi. 6 
if Zr  > 2Zi + (Yi  - Yr)  then v,.AB* = Yi + 2Zi  for  any Sa.  (4.19) 
5Note also that even though the optimal Sa forces the rival to payout the entire value,  this is  still 
below the total value under i's management (that is,  Yr + Zr  < Yi + Zi).  To  see this, note that if r's 
no-loss condition is  met exactly with 8~ < 1 and if Yi  - Yr  > 0, then Zr  - Zi  =  S~(Yi - Yr) < (Yi - Yr), 
that is, Yr + zr < Yi +  Zi.  Worse, if  Yi - Yr  > Zi,  this solution may entail a drop not just in social value 
but even in shareholder value,  from Yi  to Yr + Zr;  a  standard prisoner's dilemma prevents atomistic 
shareholders from abstaining, as the offer is conditional. If  the founder has enough flexibility in writing 
the charter, she would stop all takeovers of that type, making the solution even less 181 V. 
6The first one-bid solution, paying out the full reservation value Yr +  Zr,  is  no longer feasible here: 
it would require Sa > 1. One share, one vote?  12 
Since the two-bid solution strictly dominates here, we are back in a zone where 181 V 
is suboptimal. 
The finding thus far is that while in one domain quasi-181V does no harm, in two others 
it does.  We  no rational basis for  assessing which cases would be rare and insignificant 
and which not. 
4.2  The rival provides the larger security benefits 
In the case Yr  > Yi  a there is no unique,  immediately obvious  a priori ranking of the 
domains  of single- v.  double-bid  games.  Thus,  we  start with a separate analysis  of 
single- and dual-bid games, and afterwards identify the relevant sub  domains where each 
solution is relevant. 
First assume a charter that allows a single bid.  Equation (2.8) shows that the firm's 
value is negative in sa, so we  would like to set Sa  at a lower bound: 
•  Case  a.  The corner solution Sa  = 0 restricts the general no-loss  set,  (2.6),  to the 
subset Zi  < Zr,  where r does keep some profit. Thus, in a single-bid game, 
if Zi  :::;  Zr  then s; = 0 =? v,.A(a) = Yr +  Zi  .  (4.20) 
Given that the A shares have at least half of the votes, here, the solution Sa = 0 is as 
far from lSlV as one can get. 
•  Case  b.  Outside the subset Zj < Zr,  the founder would still like to set  Sa  as  low  as 
possible, but now she is stopped by r's no-loss constraint rather than by the natural 
zero bound.  The zero-profit solution s: =  (Zi  - Zr)/(Yr - Yi)  is  possible if it yields 
values in the range [0,1]' that is, when Zr  :::;  Zi  :::;  Zr + (Yr  - Yi).  Thus, in a single-bid 
game, 
Z· -Zr  () 
if Zr  :::;  Z;  :::;  Zr + (Yr  - Yi) then 0 :::;  s~ = -'-- :::;  1 =? v,.A b  =  Yr + Zr. 
Yr -Yi 
(4.21) 
Again this is not pseudo-1S1V--€xcept in the single special case in the corner, Sa = 1 
({:: Zi  - Zr = Yr  - Yi). 
For single-bid contests with Yr  > Yi there is no genuine zone with corner solutions Sa = 1, 
and therefore no regular quasi-1S1V zone.  Indeed, if the founder would set Sa  = 1,  the One sbare, one vote?  13 
no-loss constraint becomes  Yr  + Zr  :?:  Yi + Zi,  that is,  Zi  ~ Zr + (Yr  - Yi),  but in that 
domain, as we just saw, value maximisation requires Sa to be set as low as possible rather 
than fixed at unity. 
Now  consider  the double  bid.  Considering the value formula  (2.16)  with  its two 
Max(.)  functions, there are three possible solutions:  (c)  both of the Max() terms are in 
the money; (d)  one of them is,  and (e)  none of them is.  We still assume Yr  > Yi. 
•  Case c.  When both of the "Max" terms in the value formula (2.16) are in the money, 
"(2.16)  again simplifies to v,.AB(c) = Yi + 2zi. It is easily verified that, for both MaxO 
functions to be in the money,  Sa is necessarily in the interval [1 - z;/  (Yr - Yi), z;/  (Yr -
Yi)],  which  is  non-empty only if Zi  >  (Yr  - Yi)/2.  This condition,  and similar ones 
derived below, guarantees feasibility, not optimality. 
•  Case d.  Without loss of generality, assume the first Max in the money, the second one 
out. These outcomes require, respectively, Sa < z;/  (Yr - Yi) - which is always feasible 
because Zi  :?:  0 - and Sa < 1 - z;/(Yr - Yi),  which is feasible iff 1- z;/(Yr - Yi)  > 0, 
i.e.  Zi  < Yr  - Yi.  The value-maximising double-bid charter in this case  is  Sa  =  0 
(when the first  Max is  positive), or Sa  =  1 (when the second Max is positive).7  In 
either case the value formula (2.16) reduces to v,.AB(d) =  Yr + Zi. 
•  Case e.  When both of the "Max" terms in the value formula (2.16) are out the money 
we have v,.AB(e)  =  Yr'  For both MaxO functions to be out the money,  Sa is necessarily 
in the interval [z;/ (Yr-Yi), l-z;/(Yr -Yi)], which is non-empty only iff Zi  < (Yr -Yi)/2. 
Table 2 shows the proper orderings of the various  possible  intervals for  the three 
possible orderings of Zr  relative to Yr  - Yi  and  (Yr  - Yi)/2.  The table indicates which 
solution is possible where, what the resulting value is,  and which value is dominated by 
an alternative charter. We note that the double-bid contest with premia for both shares, 
case c,  is  preferred only for high values of z., while the bid without any premium at all, 
case e,  is not used at all.  Case d is potentially more popular but does not add any value 
7For instance, set 8a = O.  This means that A's pre- and post-takeover security value is zero, so that 
r  needs to offer no more than Zi  for  the voting rights so as  to pre-eampt a counterbid by i for the A 
shares.  The condition Zi  < (Yr - Yi)/2 implies Yr  > Yi + 2zi, that is, the security value of the B-shares 
(Vr)  exceeds i's reservation value (Yi + Zi)'  Thus, r offers the new security value for B, and value-wise 






Table 2:  possible outcomes when Yr  - Yi  > 0 
1b:::::J/i 
2 
VA = Yr +  Zi 
Panel A:  when Zr  > Yr - Yi  > 0 
Yr  - Yi 
VA = Yr +  Zi 
Zr+71r  1Ii 
2 
(VA =Yr +Zi)  VA = Yr +Z; 
(VAB = Yi +  2Zi)  V Al1  = Yi +  2Zi 
d  VAl1 = Yr +Z;  VAl> = Yr + Zi 
e  (VAB = Yr) 
case I  Panel B: when Yr  - Yi  > Zr  > (Yr - Yi)/2 > 0 
Zi:  1b:::::J/i 
2 
Zr+Ur  1/i 
2 
a  VA = Yr + Zi  VA = Yr +Zi 
b  VA=Yr+Zr  VA = Yr +  Zr 
c  (VAB = Yi + 2Zi)  (VAB = Yi + 2Zi) 
d  VAl> = Yr + Z;  VIll:J = Yr + Z;  (VAB = Yr +  Zi)  (VAB = Yr + Zi) 
e  (VAB = Yr) 
case I  Panel C: when (Yr - Yi)/2 > Zr 
z.;:  Yr - Yi 
a  VA = Yr +Zi 
b  VA = Yr + Zr  VIl=Yr+Zr  VA = Yr +  Zr 
c  (vAB = Yi + 2Zi) 
d  VAl:J =Yr+z.;  V Al1 = Yr +  z.;  (VAB =  Yr +  Zi)  (VAB =  Yr + Z') 




Zr +Yr - Yi 
VIl=Yr+Zr 
Key to Table 2.  The table shows the possible outcomes for  various voting rules (the lines) 
and intervals for Zi (the columns) when Yr - Yi  > O.  The entries in the first row show the critical 
z.;-values that mark the intervals.  An empty box means that for the stated parameter combi-
nations there is no bid possible of that type.  A value in small font and between parentheses 
indicates that, for these parameter values, another charter is available that produces a higher 
value.  Case a and b are single-bid cases, where the A shares are either pure voting stocks (case 
a:  Sa = 0) or receive the rent-extracting income share (case b:  Sa = (Zi - Zr) / (Yr - Yi)).  Cases 
c - e are double-bid charters where, respectively, two, one, or none of the "Max" terms in the 
value formula (2.16)  are in the money.  In case c, any Sa  in [1- Zi/(Yr - Yi),Zi/(Yr - Yi)]  will 
do, in case d we  need Sa =  1 or 0,  case e imposes no restrictions on Sa.  The required voting 
rights for each case can be found in Table 1. One share, one vote?  15 
to the single-bid solution a:  in terms of shareholder value,  buying the B shares at the 
post-bid security value SbYr  does not bring any gains to the investor relative to leaving 
these shares in the market. 
With respect to optimal voting/sharing structure, we  have already noted that the 
quasi-1S1V case does not occur at all when Yr  > Y;,  a conclusion that worsens the already 
dismal picture we got for Yi  > Yr  (where only one of the solutions produces lSI  V). This 
negative conclusion confirms that our earlier results are due to the extension of the GH-
HR ex post analysis to cases where private benefits arise on  both sides,  not to the ex 
ante aspect. The ex post analysis also predicts the patterns we find in the ex ante work, 
althrough the latter are, of course, smeared out.  The ex post analysis also tells us that 
the sign of (Yr  - Yi)  makes a lot of difference.  This explains why in the single bid the 
effect of Sa on value gets so blurred when realisations with positive (Yr - Yi)  get mixed 
with negative sampled values, and why the optimal SaS are occasionally V-shaped in z.,. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper, we extend the theoretical framework in Grossman and Hart (1988)  and 
Harris and Raviv (1989), by looking extensively at control contests when both the rival 
and incumbent potentially can enjoy  private perks or  realize synergies  from  being in 
control of the target firm.  The analysis  of  the game  adds interesting new  elements 
to the above seminal  papers,  and shows  that within our setting IS1V can rarely be 
an optimal structure in terms of maximising the IPQ value  of the firm  if the rival's 
characteristics are known in advance.  lS1V lacks two useful ingredients:  the flexibility 
in sharing rules that sometimes leads to complete rent extraction, and the extra premia 
that sometimes have to be paid when r needs two classes of shares while, to i, one class 
is sufficient to maintain the status quo.  We also allow for the rival's characteristics to be 
stochastic at the time the charter is written, and we  numerically solve for  the optimal 
structure by maximising expected firm value across a distribution of possible rivals.  We 
find that lSIV never comes out first.  A last contribution of the paper is that we explore 
the gains from issuing more than two classes of shares. One share, one vote?  16 
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